An Empirical Analysis of Chain Reorganizations and Double-Spend Attacks on Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies - Student Thesis

Abstract:

Nakamoto consensus has powered Bitcoin and the cryptocurrency industry over the past 10 years, but its security properties when an adversary's economic incentives are taken into account remain poorly understood. Recently, reports of successful real-world attacks against some coins have served as a wake-up call for the industry to review each coins' consensus risk. This research contributes a new system for detecting transaction reordering events against live cryptocurrencies. We deployed the system on a spectrum of different cryptocurrencies and combined our results with historical market data to analyze how the properties of each coin affect its consensus risk and evaluate the effectiveness of existing theoretical models for quantifying the cost of attack. We also describe some of the significant attacks we detected, providing empirical evidence that launching an attack can be practical, and that counterattacking may be a viable strategy for victims to defend themselves from an economically rational adversary.

People:

MEng Author: James Lovejoy, MEng Graduate Researcher 2019 Academic Year
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Neha Narula, Director, MIT Digital Currency Initiative


PRoject Presentation

On July 9, 2020, MIT DCI MEng graduate James Lovejoy presented the project Reorg Tracker, part of his thesis research, in a talk titled “Detecting Attacks Against Proof-of-Work” at the Crypto Economics Security Conference 2020. Software Developer Gert-Jaap Glasbergen also presented on the project Pool Detective during the talk.

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ADESS: a proof of work blockchain protocol modification to deter double-spend attacks

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Application of Programmability to Commercial Banking and Payments with JPMC